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I. The Facts and petitioners’ arguments 
Earlier this year, the boxer Mike Tyson, a citizen of the United States, was invited to 
fight two boxing matches in Glasgow and Manchester.  In 1992, Mike Tyson was tried 
and convicted in the United States of rape. He was sentenced to six years in prison and 
eventually served close to three years of this sentence. In 1999, Mr Tyson once again 
served 9 months in prison for assaulting two motorists after a traffic accident. Upon his 
release, Mr Tyson returned to boxing, and continued what had been a successful career. 
In order to enter the United Kingdom lawfully, Mr Tyson was required under 
section 3(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 to apply for leave. The grounds on which leave 
for entry to the United Kingdom can be refused are to be found in s3(2) of the 1971 Act. 
This provision allows the Secretary of State ‘from time to time […] to lay before 
Parliament statements of the rules, or of any changes in the rules, laid down by him as 
to the practice to be followed in the administration of this Act for regulating the entry 
into and stay in the United Kingdom’. Rule 320 of the rules, produced under s3(2) of the 
1971 Act, sets out in more detail the grounds on which permission to enter the United 
Kingdom will normally be refused. Paragraph 18 of rule 320 stipulates that leave can be 
refused in the following circumstance: 
save where the Immigration Officer is satisfied that admission would be 
justified for strong compassionate reasons, conviction in any country 
including the United Kingdom of an offence which, if committed in the United 
Kingdom, is punishable with imprisonment for a term of 12 months or any 
greater punishment or, if committed outside the United Kingdom, would be 
so punishable if the conduct constituting the offence had occurred in the 
United Kingdom. 
Rape is an offence which fulfils this criterion, as it is punishable in Scotland with 
imprisonment for a period exceeding that of 12 months (see R v Roberts and Roberts 
[1982] 4 Cr App R (S) 8). 
The legal status of the immigration rules is difficult to categorise or classify. As 
stated by Lord Denning MR at pages 780-781 in R v the Secretary of State for Home Office 
ex parte Hosenball [1977]: 
They are not rules of law. They are rules of practice laid down for the 
guidance of immigration officers and tribunals who are entrusted with the 
administration of the Act. They can be, and often are, prayed in aid by 
applicants before the courts in immigration cases. […] In addition, the courts 
always have regard to those rules, not only in matters where there is a right 
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of appeal; but also in cases under prerogative writs where there is a question 
whether the officers have acted fairly. But they are not rules in the nature of 
delegated legislation so as to amount to strict rules of law. 
The decision-maker has significant discretion in deciding whether and how they 
will be used in practice, as the provision stipulates that the rules will apply ‘normally’. In 
light of this, Mr Jack Straw MP, acting in his capacity as Secretary of State, instructed 
immigration officers to allow entry to Mr Tyson to the United Kingdom so he could 
participate in both boxing matches. 
The decision was announced in the House of Commons during Parliamentary 
Question time by Mr Straw. More specifically, Mr Straw noted the following: 
In reaching my decision I took note of the fact that Mr Tyson has relevant 
convictions for the purpose of the application of this Rule. I also noted that 
there are recent allegations of an assault on an employee of a night-club in 
Las Vegas, but we understand this is still under investigation. And I took into 
account the views expressed by the public about Mr Tyson visiting the UK. 
I did not consider that there were strong compassionate reasons which 
would justify admission in Mr Tyson's case for the purposes of the Rules. 
However, I concluded that there were other exceptional circumstances 
which justified his entry to the country for the purpose of participating in the 
boxing match. My decision took account of the following factors: 
- that Mr Tyson's behaviour on his previous visit to the UK was satisfactory; 
- that any risk to the public to which his criminal convictions and the other 
allegations referred to above might be relevant, would be minimised by the 
circumstances of his proposed visit, i.e. his high media profile, the presence 
of his trainers and other supporting entourage and the limited duration of 
his visit; 
- and that a refusal to permit entry would result in loss of economic benefit 
to the UK and in particular to the areas in which engagements took place and 
would not enhance the UK's standing as a venue for major sporting events. 
The first petitioners, the Rape Crisis Centre, offer free and confidential emotional 
and practical support, information and advocacy to all members of the public  who have 
experienced sexual violence at any time in their lives. Furthermore, they work to change 
attitudes about gender-based violence and improve services for survivors of sexual 
assault. 
The second petitioner, Ms Brindley, is employed by Rape Crisis Centre and assists 
rape and sexual assault victims in their subsequent interactions with the police and the 
criminal justice system. She also serves as a member of the Scottish Partnership on 
Domestic Abuse, a body funded by the Scottish Executive to reduce the number of 
incidents of rape and violence in Scotland. 
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The petitioners seek the reduction of the Secretary of State’s decision on the 
ground that the decision is procedurally improper. They note that in his statements, the 
Secretary of State accepted that he ‘took into account the views expressed by the public 
about Mr Tyson's visiting the United Kingdom’. This referred to a meeting the Secretary 
of State had with individuals who would describe themselves as supporters of Mr 
Tyson, namely individuals who had invited Mr Tyson to Glasgow. The petitioners’ 
argument is as follows: as this was a matter of exceptional and legitimate public 
interest, it was procedurally improper for the Minister not to also receive 
representations from groups opposing Mr Tyson’s entry to the country. While the 
petitioners concede that hearing views from the public is at the Minister’s discretion, by 
seeking the views of one party he should have acted in accordance with the rules of 
natural justice and taken representations from the opposing side as well. The 
petitioners argue that this duty was dictated by the principle of audi alterem partem. 
The petitioners argued that they had important additional material to bring to the 
attention of the Secretary of State, which arose from their activities in Scotland, that 
would have allowed him to make a more informed decision on the issue at hand. 
Counsel for the Secretary of State argued that Mr Straw was aware of the arguments 
against entry and that the petitioners would have nothing of substance to add to the 
information of which he was already aware. Additionally, the petitioners argued that the 
considerations Mr Straw took into account when reaching his decision were irrelevant 
and, consequently, he was abusing the discretion conferred on him by the 1971 Act. 
Therefore, it is for this Court  to respond to three questions: 
1. Do the petitioners fulfil the requirements of locus standi in Scots law? Namely, 
can they demonstrate both title and interest to sue? 
2. Do the rules of natural justice generate a legal duty for the Minister to hear 
representations from the petitioners before reaching his decision to allow Mr 
Tyson entry to the United Kingdom? 
3. Were the considerations Mr Straw took into account when reaching his decision 
relevant? More specifically, was Mr Straw’s key consideration (that hosting a 
sports event of international interest would enhance the UK’s sporting 
reputation), one that the Secretary of State was entitled to take into account 
when exercising his discretion in relation to immigration?  
The Court will address each of these issues in turn. 
 
II. Rules of locus standi. 
Before examining the merits of the petitioners’ arguments, this Court must assess 
whether the petitioners satisfy the criteria for standing (locus standi).  
The rules of standing differ between Scotland and England. In Scotland, 
petitioners are required to demonstrate that they have both title and interest to sue. It 
is not contested by the parties that the petitioners, by virtue of their function, have 
interest to sue. The Rape Crisis Centre is a well-known organisation that supports 
survivors of sexual assault. Ms Brindley has many years of experience representing the 
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interests of those who have been exposed to any form of sexual violence. Therefore, 
they clearly have an interest in the decision being set aside.  
With regards to title to sue, Lord Dunedin’s dictum in D & J Nicol v Dundee 
Harbour Trustees 1915 S.C. (H.L.) 7 remains relevant. In that judgment, his Lordship 
explained that in order to have title to sue, the petitioner must demonstrate that he is ‘a 
party (using the word in its widest sense) to some legal relation which gives him [sic] 
some right which the person against whom he raises the action either infringes or 
denies’. 
This precludes this Court from examining petitions where the petitioner can only 
demonstrate an academic interest in the outcome of the case or is seeking to reduce a 
decision merely because it is not to her liking. Such petitioners do not satisfy the criteria 
required to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session in Scotland. 
The Rules on which Mr Straw relied do not confer any rights to the general 
public. The only rights they confer are to Mr Tyson and potentially the boxing promoter. 
This of course means that the petitioners in this case do not meet the criteria for locus 
standi in Scotland. 
Such a requirement for the petitioner to show title to sue is not in place in 
England, where petitioners need only demonstrate a sufficient interest in the outcome 
of the case. Earlier this year, for instance, Mr Tyson’s visit to the United Kingdom for the 
boxing match scheduled to take place in Manchester was the subject of a different legal 
challenge before Mr Justice Sullivan in Regina v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Bindel at the High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division. While 
the petitioners, a similar women’s group, were ultimately unsuccessful on the merits, no 
issue of standing arose, unlike in these proceedings.  
The rules of standing, as formulated in Scotland, require campaign and advocacy 
organisations who wish to challenge administrative decision-making to either seek 
litigants who fulfil the criteria for standing or limit their contribution to public interest 
interventions under Rule 58.8A of the Rules of the Court of Session where this is 
possible. In cases like these, the title and interest requirement found in Scots law 
renders decisions such as the one made by Mr Straw potentially immune from judicial 
review as exercised under the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session. In the 
case at hand, since the Minister’s decision is favourable to Mr Tyson and the boxing 
promoters, the decision becomes one that is out of the reach of the Scottish courts, since 
only Mike Tyson himself or the boxing promoters could have petitioned to challenge the 
Secretary of State’s decision. Thus, there are key and perhaps problematic differences in 
how public interest issues are dealt with in England and how they are dealt with in 
Scotland.  
This brings to mind the dictum by Lord Diplock, making reference to the English 
rules of standing in R v Inland Revenue Commissioners Ex p National Federation of Self 
Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617, at p 644: 
It would, in my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a 
pressure group were prevented by outdated technical rules of locus standi 
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from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to vindicate the rule of 
law and get the unlawful conduct stopped. 
There are of course good reasons to justify the restrictive rules in Scotland. If 
mounting a challenge were open to anyone, significant time of the courts might be taken 
up, and respondents (mostly government departments already functioning on limited 
budgets) would be forced to withstand the time and costs of litigation brought against 
them by such petitioners. This approach, however, is deeply disadvantageous to 
vulnerable groups or individuals, who may not wish to be involved in litigation or lack 
the necessary resources, and usually rely on the assistance of NGOs or other charities to 
put forward legal arguments on their behalf. 
In England, women’s pressure groups have achieved some success by petitioning 
against administrative decisions without having to produce a litigant with title to sue. 
For instance, the House of Lords in R. v Secretary of State for Employment Ex p. Equal 
Opportunities Commission [1995] 1 A.C. 1 permitted the Equal Opportunities 
Commission to challenge provisions of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 
1978 on the basis that these were incompatible with the United Kingdom’s anti-
discrimination obligations under European Community law, namely Council Directive 
75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 (the Equal Pay Directive) and Council Directive 
76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 (the Equal Treatment Directive). In this case, the group 
was found to have ‘sufficient interest’ on the basis that the organisation played a key 
role in the fight for equality and the elimination of gender discrimination. Also, the 
organisations in question played an important role in giving advice, guidance and 
assistance to any claimants for these purposes. This was considered sufficient for the 
petitioners to fulfil the requirement of locus standi. 
In light of this, in this case, the Court also notes the nature of the work carried out 
by the petitioner organisation. It seeks to support victims of rape, and sexual assault 
more broadly, all particularly odious crimes where survivors have to overcome 
significant obstacles when deciding to disclose their experiences, including the distress 
of recounting their experience in a courtroom. This makes many survivors reluctant to 
speak up. As a result, their experiences have often been overlooked or disregarded. This 
makes the role of organisations such as those petitioning the Court of Session in this 
case all the more important. Recent academic research by mental health professionals 
treating survivors of sexual violence demonstrates the ‘secondary victimisation’ of rape 
victims who speak up to seek redress (for example, Rebecca Campbell and Sheela Raja, 
‘Secondary Victimization of Rape Victims: Insights from Mental Health Professionals 
Who Treat Survivors of Violence’ (1999) 14 Violence and Victims 261). The petitioner 
organisation is therefore indispensable in giving voice to the very serious concerns 
raised by Mr Tyson’s visit and providing, beyond psychological support to survivors, 
legal interventions where it is in the interest of its members or the broader public 
interest to do so. 
It is therefore hoped that the rules of locus standi in Scots law, which prohibit the 
petitioners from suing in this instance, will be revisited by the Inner House of the Court 
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of Session or the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords soon, to correct what 
seems to be an unjust system of determining standing. 
A lack of standing usually means that the reviewing court will not examine the 
remaining arguments put forward by the petitioners. However, the Secretary of State 
has argued that the petitioners' averments are irrelevant and that the petition should be 
dismissed for that reason, quite apart from questions of title and interest. For reasons of 
clarity and completeness, even though there is no standing in this case, I provide 
responses to the Secretary of State’s arguments against the claim brought by the 
petitioners. It is a matter of primary significance whether Mr Straw’s actions were 
procedurally improper and whether his decision was one he was entitled to reach. Even 
if this Court cannot provide a remedy due to lack of standing in this case, it can assist in 
determining future similar cases, by suggesting what the rules of natural justice require 
for a decision of this kind to be fair. 
III. Right to be heard / Audi alteram partem 
The petitioners seek reduction of the Secretary of State’s decision on the basis that Mr 
Straw exercised his discretion to accept submissions from Mr Tyson’s supporters. This, 
according to the petitioners, generated a common law duty on Mr Straw to also hear 
submissions from those opposing Mr Tyson’s entry to the United Kingdom. The 
petitioners argued that the Minister would have reached a more informed and balanced 
decision by providing them with the opportunity to make representations. 
This argument raises important questions relating to the common law principles 
of natural justice (fairness), a component of which is audi alteram partem (the right to 
be heard). This common law principle allows an individual who may be adversely 
affected by an impending decision to make representations to the decision-maker. In 
Ridge v Baldwin [1963] UKHL 2, Lord Reid famously noted that the principle of audi 
alteram partem ‘goes back many centuries in our law and appears in a multitude of 
judgments of judges of the highest authority’. This principle, along with the common law 
rules against bias, is a prerequisite for a decision to be fair. But when is this duty 
triggered? Namely, under what circumstances will a failure of a decision-maker to take 
representations before reaching a decision render their decision unfair and therefore a 
nullity? Fairness in decision-making is a broad principle and its exact meaning falls to 
be determined in the specific context of each case. As Lord Bridge explains in Lloyd v 
McMahon [1987] UKHL 5: 
[T]he so-called rules of natural justice are not engraved on tablets of stone. To 
use the phrase which better expresses the underlying concept, what the 
requirements of fairness demand when anybody, domestic, administrative or 
judicial, has to make a decision which will affect the rights of individuals 
depends on the character of the decision-making body, the kind of decision it 
has to make and the statutory or other framework in which it operates.  
  Therefore, the norms the decision-maker has to follow to ensure the fairness of 
the decision will depend on various factors. It is not surprising that Mr Straw sought to 
hear from Mr Tyson’s team, as their interests, primarily pecuniary in nature, would be 
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directly affected by the decision. Would fairness in this context, however, also create a 
duty on the Minister to hear representations from the petitioners?  
Here it is important to keep in mind Glidewell LJ’s dicta, in R v Lautro ex parte 
Ross [1993] QB 17 at p 50: ‘the law does not require the decision-making body to give 
an opportunity to every person who may be affected, however remotely, by its decision, 
to make representations before the decision is reached. Such a principle would be 
unworkable in practice’. Therefore, it is for this Court to determine whether in this case 
the interests of the petitioners (which will be discussed further below) can be viewed as 
‘remote’, so as to absolve the Minister of the duty to take representations.   
The purpose of audi alteram partem is to ensure that anyone whose interests may 
be affected negatively by an imminent decision is permitted to argue their position 
before the decision-maker in advance of that decision being made. There must, 
however, be some nexus between the decision and the interests of the petitioners. As 
discussed above in reference to the issue of standing, the immigration rules do not 
confer any rights to the petitioners or generate any obligations on them. The two parties 
involved in the decision to grant leave to enter to Mr Tyson are Mr Straw and Mr Tyson 
himself. Any dispute about Mr Tyson’s entry to the country would be a dispute between 
the Minister and Mr Tyson. Lord Diplock addressed this point in Cheall v Association of 
Professional Executive Clerical and Computer Staff [1983] 2 A.C. 180. At 190 he held that: 
Decisions that resolve disputes between the parties to them, whether by 
litigation or some other adversarial dispute-resolving process, often have 
consequences which affect persons who are not parties to the dispute; but 
the legal concept of natural justice has never been extended to give such 
persons […] rights to be heard by the decision-making tribunal before the 
decision is reached. 
In accordance with this authority, it would be difficult to conclude that Mr Straw 
was under a common law duty to take representations from the petitioners for his 
decision to be fair. The lack of a legal duty, however, should not discourage a Minister 
from seeking the broadest possible assistance when reaching decisions that will cause 
distress to marginalised groups. Administrative decision-making can only benefit from 
exposure to all available advice, especially advice that is the result of comprehensive 
research on (and engagement with) the issues that form the basis of the petitioners’ 
specialist knowledge in this case. Ignoring the concerns, and expertise, of the petitioners 
and choosing to meet Mr Tyson’s representatives in secret does not contribute to the 
values of openness and transparency one would associate with fair decision-making. Mr 
Straw’s refusal to meet the petitioners and engage with their views may undermine the 
legitimacy of his decision in the eyes of the public and sends an alarming message to 
survivors of sexual assault. It suggests that the government not only does not have their 
interests in mind, but refuses to engage with them altogether. 
Additionally, counsel for Mr Straw argued that he was aware of the issues the 
petitioners were planning to raise and therefore it was not necessary to provide them 
with a hearing. The suggestion that Mr Straw had no need to hear opposing views 
because he was already aware of the arguments the petitioners would have presented is 
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unconvincing. The petitioners were hoping to deliver evidence to the Minister, based on 
their expertise, that rewarding Mr Tyson with significant sums of money for a boxing 
match would send the wrong message to impressionable young males, therefore 
contributing to the perpetuation of ‘rape culture’. Mr Tyson’s visit could thus be viewed 
as a direct insult to women in Scotland who have survived rape, sexual assault and are 
facing, on a day to day basis, the repercussions of the violence to which they were 
subjected. While the threat of Mr Tyson reoffending while in the UK was taken into 
account by Mr Straw, who concluded that no such risk exists, it was also vital for the 
Minister to consider the psychological harm his visit, and the celebrations associated 
with it, could cause to others. They key concerns associated with permitting Mr Tyson 
entry to the UK, beyond the risk of his reoffending, relate to the fact that his example 
would affect impressionable young minds and further the suffering of women and other 
survivors of sexual assault by celebrating and normalising his behaviour, while at the 
same time ignoring the harm that this celebration might trigger. 
The petitioners, both the Rape Crisis Centre and Ms Brindley, through their work 
and advocacy are uniquely placed to provide information to the Minister on the impact 
his decision would have upon survivors of sexual assault and more widely. In carrying 
out this assessment, no other body in Scotland could have provided more insight and 
vital information. It is highly unpersuasive for the Minister to proclaim that his 
expertise on the matter equals that of the Centre and that the petitioners would have 
nothing of substance to add. While Mr Straw may believe he has a clear idea of how 
allowing a convicted rapist into the country may affect survivors and our understanding 
of sexual crime, he certainly would have more to hear from the petitioners. Hearing 
their views on a matter of public interest when reaching this decision, especially in light 
of its impact, would not have been too onerous. 
In spite of this, it would be unpersuasive to suggest that hearing the 
representations from the petitioners was a duty that is recognised in law. For reasons of 
propriety, Mr Straw should have been more attuned to the concerns of the petitioners 
before making his decision. Yet, based on our understanding of fairness as developed 
through common law, especially R v Lautro ex parte Ross, the scheme of immigration 
rules under which Mr Straw made his decision to admit Mr Tyson into the UK created 
no legal duty to take representations from the petitioners. It is hoped that, 
notwithstanding this fact, more attention will be paid to such matters in administrative 
decision-making when similar issues arise in the future. Good decision-making can only 
be achieved where decision-makers seek the widest expertise available on an issue, and 
they should aspire to this even where they do not have a legal duty to do so. 
IV. Relevant and Irrelevant considerations / Abuse of Discretion 
Another ground on which the decision should be examined is abuse of discretion on the 
basis of irrelevant considerations. The petitioners argue that Mr Straw’s consideration 
when applying the immigration rules (protecting the reputation of the United Kingdom 
as a desirable venue to host sporting events) was irrelevant. If this is the case, Mr Straw 
would be abusing his discretion and the decision would be a nullity.  
9 
 
Judicial control of administrative action has developed so as to allow courts to 
assess whether or not the decision-maker’s discretion was exercised properly (Padfield 
v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997). A decision-maker can, 
among other reasons, misdirect herself in the law when she takes into account 
extraneous or irrelevant considerations. On occasion, the statute that confers decision-
making powers to the decision-maker will explicitly set out the considerations that 
must be taken into account for the decision to be reached lawfully. More often, however, 
it is for the courts to determine which matters are relevant or irrelevant, after 
examining the terms of the legislation as a whole (Harvey v Strathclyde Regional Council 
1989 S.L.T. 25; 1989 S.L.T. 612, HL). It was also established in R v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, ex parte Venables [1998] AC 407, that power is not lawfully 
exercised if a body takes ‘irrelevant considerations’ into account or fails to take account 
of relevant factors. Additionally, in R v Somerset County Council ex parte Fewings [1995] 
3 All ER 20 it was held that whilst a body may not take into account any irrelevant 
considerations, it is not required to take into account all relevant considerations.  
Applying the law to the case at hand, when reaching his decision, Mr Straw 
helpfully laid out the considerations he took into account. He evaluated Mr Tyson’s 
behaviour during his last visit to the United Kingdom, he assessed the financial damage 
to the organisers if the event did not go ahead as planned, he claimed to be aware of the 
issues raised by the petitioners and, finally, he argued that ‘a refusal to permit entry […] 
would not enhance the UK's standing as a venue for major sporting events’. It is not for 
the court in the course of judicial review proceedings to weigh these competing 
considerations against each other and determine which would be paramount. That 
discretion has been conferred by Parliament to the Minister. Judicial review is not an 
appeal on the merits of the decision and does not allow the court to set aside the 
decision merely on the ground that it would have reached a different conclusion under 
the same circumstances. It is for the Court of Session, however, in the exercise of its 
supervisory jurisdiction, to determine whether the Minister was entitled to take these 
considerations into account when exercising his discretion. 
It is clear that the immigration rule in question – Rule 320 – confers significant 
discretion to the Minister to allow entry to convicted criminals for reasons other than 
compassion (which is explicitly mentioned in the rules). However, even though the 
discretion is considerable, it is not without limits. Here, I will focus on one of the 
considerations mentioned above, namely, the interest relating to the enhancement of 
the UK’s reputation as a sporting venue.  
In order to determine whether such a consideration would be relevant, the Court 
must first establish the policy and object of the power-conferring instruments, namely 
the 1971 Act and the immigration rules. In Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food [1968] AC 997, Lord Reid noted at 1029 that: 
Parliament must have conferred the discretion with the intention that it 
should be used to promote the policy and objects of the Act; the policy and 
objects of the Act must be determined by construing the Act as a whole and 
construction is always a matter of law for the Court. In a matter of this kind it 
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is not possible to draw a hard and fast line, but if the Minister, by reason of 
his having misconstrued the Act or for any other reason, so uses his 
discretion as to thwart or run counter to the policy and objects of the Act, 
then our law would be very defective if persons aggrieved were not entitled 
to the protection of the Court. 
Reading the 1971 Act as a whole, alongside the immigration rules, the following 
conclusions about their policy and object can be reached. The 1971 Act seeks to regulate 
the entry of foreign nationals into the UK and to provide a statutory basis for 
deportations. The key consideration behind administrative decisions in the Act is the 
promotion of ‘the public good’. Entry or deportation of foreign nationals is assessed on 
this basis. More specifically, there are multiple references to the ‘public good’ in the Act 
- for instance s3(5)(b) or s9(4)(a) - that instruct the Minister to make immigration-
related decisions with reference to this public good. Additionally, the Rules regulate the 
conditions for entry into the UK of convicted criminals. The assessments that 
immigration officials are required to make relate to the potential harm that could be 
caused by allowing entry to the offender (Rule 320(19)). Additionally, the Rules call 
upon immigration officials to focus on the character of the convicted individual (Rule 
320(19)) and their past behaviour (Rule 320(18)). The Rules explicitly prohibit entry 
into the UK of convicted criminals whose offences are punishable by at least 12 months 
imprisonment and create an exception to this rule for compassionate reasons. These 
references to potential harm, the character of the offender and their past behaviour, and 
the bar to entry for individuals who have committed offences carrying sentences of at 
least 12 months imprisonment, lead me to very specific conclusions about the policy 
and object of the immigration framework. It is evident to me that this framework is 
intended to secure public safety and to ensure that members of the UK public are not 
exposed to undue harm. The overriding purpose of barring convicts from entering the 
UK is to protect the public, and any exceptions must be examined through this lens. 
Therefore, there is in the broader immigration framework within which Mr Straw’s 
decision is located a presumption in favour of not providing entry to individuals in Mr 
Tyson’s circumstances.  
It is this potential harm to public safety that Mr Straw seems to have ignored by 
refusing to meet with the petitioners. While he noted that he was aware of their 
concerns and confirmed that he took into account the possibility of Mr Tyson 
committing new crimes in the UK (a possibility that was remote according to the 
Minister), Mr Straw did not adequately examine the concerns the petitioners have about 
Mr Tyson’s visit. I have discussed these concerns in detail when examining audi alteram 
partem in this judgment: they relate to the endorsement of rape culture caused by Mr 
Tyson’s visit and the psychological harm to which survivors of sexual assault will be 
exposed, both of which might be conceived of as related to public safety. Instead, Mr 
Straw chose to focus on how Mr Tyson’s visit will affect the reputation of the UK as a 
desirable sporting venue.  
While the Minister has significant discretion to override the presumption in 
favour of not allowing Mr Tyson to enter the UK, Mr Straw’s suggestion that the normal 
rule will not apply on the basis of enhancing the reputation of sport in the UK is difficult 
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to accept as a consideration that is in line with the overall purpose of the immigration 
framework discussed above. A ‘sports exception’ to immigration laws for convicted 
criminals seems to be drawn out of thin air. It does not seem to me to be the result of a 
thorough assessment of the issues at hand keeping in mind the policy and objectives of 
the framework under the 1971 Act and the rules and, as such, could rightly be described 
as an irrelevant consideration. While the Court agrees with counsel for the government 
that compassionate reasons are not the only reasons that would allow the Minister to 
grant leave to a convicted criminal, these other reasons for such exceptional treatment 
must be linked closely to the overall policy objectives promoted by the immigration 
framework. Otherwise, the decision is arbitrary. 
To conclude, the very real and concrete harm caused by the visit, which the 
petitioners highlighted, cannot within the bounds of the Minister’s discretion be 
balanced against an opaque and unprovable promise that Mr Tyson’s visit will enhance 
the UK’s sporting reputation.  The Minister’s taking into account such considerations is 
extremely difficult to justify when attending to the purpose of the 1971 Act and the 
immigration rules. Therefore, I reach the conclusion that in this matter, by allowing 
exceptional entry to the UK for Mr Tyson, the Home Secretary abused his discretion by 
taking into account irrelevant considerations. Due to the lack of standing, however, this 
Court cannot nullify Mr Straw’s decision. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
It is unfortunate that the rules of standing in Scotland do not allow this case to move 
forward as the equivalent case, brought by a similar pressure group, did in England. 
This speaks to the obstacles particular to Scotland that pressure groups and NGOs such 
as the Rape Crisis Centre face when trying to challenge decisions of this nature. This is 
detrimental not just to the petitioners and those that they represent but more broadly 
to the rule of law. Judicial review is a key means by which to check the powers of the 
state and to ensure that decisions reached are lawful. Invoking the Court of Session’s 
supervisory jurisdiction should, therefore, not be restricted to too small a group of 
persons. The ability to invoke this jurisdiction should extend to groups acting in the 
public interest who can convincingly argue that the relevant decision affects the 
interests of the section of the public they seek to represent. This is particularly 
pertinent where survivors of rape seek representation through an organisation, such as 
Rape Crisis, which has developed unparalleled expertise in fighting on their behalf.   
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Reflective Statement on rewriting Rape Crisis Centre v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department 
 
Rape Crisis Centre v Secretary of State for the Home Department, decided on 2nd June 
2000 by the Outer House of the Court of Session, offers ample opportunity to engage 
with the key themes and objectives of the Scottish Feminist Judgments Project.  
The original judgment delivered by Lord Clarke is straightforward. The 
petitioners did not satisfy the test of standing that applied in Scotland at the time and, 
consequently, the case was dismissed. Lord Clarke in the original judgment eloquently 
summarised the relevant law and offered convincing reasons for his conclusions. When 
viewed through a feminist lens, however, the judgment is disappointing. This is not 
merely because the judgment did not deliver the outcome the petitioners would have 
hoped for, but because the facts of the case raised significant feminist issues which were 
largely left unaddressed. This provided fertile ground for a rewritten, feminist judgment 
which would delve in greater depth into these points. 
In my view, there are a number of key issues in the case which I hoped to address 
in my rewritten judgment. Firstly, the issue of standing raises important questions 
about the role of pressure groups such as Rape Crisis Centre in keeping government 
accountable for its actions through judicial review. This is a particularly pressing matter 
for organisations that represent women who have survived sexual assault and who may, 
for very good reasons, not be willing or able to initiate litigation themselves. Secondly, 
and turning to the substance of the Minister’s decision, I was struck by Mr Straw’s 
approach to weighing the competing considerations in this case. As activists at the time 
eloquently argued, Mr Straw had clearly placed profit and the UK’s reputation as a 
desirable sports venue before the specific needs of survivors of rape and indeed those of 
the public at large. Could there be any legal recourse for this considering the limited 
role of judicial review in challenging the merits of administrative decision-making? This, 
I felt, was at least worth exploring. Finally, the rather condescending approach by Mr 
Straw towards the petitioners and their expertise (according to him, they had nothing of 
substance to add to what he already knew) was endorsed by Lord Clarke in the original 
judgment. As he noted, 
While counsel for the petitioners endeavoured to persuade me that the 
petitioners had particular additional material to bring to the attention of the 
Secretary of State which arose from their activities in Scotland, I was not 
satisfied that counsel was in a position to specify anything which raised 
matters of substance, which differed from, or would have added materially 
to, the views of which the Secretary of State must have already been fully 
aware.1 
                                                          
1 Rape Crisis Centre v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2000 S.C. 527, 538. 
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This approach seemed problematic to me particularly because it ignored the 
specialist knowledge and expertise that Rape Crisis Scotland had developed over the 
years.  
These issues became the impetus for me to explore whether a judgment that 
addressed these controversies head-on, relying on the law as it was at the time, would 
have made any substantial difference or added anything of value to the original 
judgment.  
Rewriting the judgment required me to make many difficult choices. I was 
originally planning to discuss the relevance of the economic considerations that, 
according to Mr Straw, outweighed the legitimate concerns the petitioners had about Mr 
Tyson’s entry to the UK. This was one of the key aspects of Mr Straw’s decision that 
rightfully outraged feminist campaigners and rape support groups at the time.2 From a 
legal standpoint, and taking into account the limited capacity judicial review offers to 
challenge the merits of a decision, I discovered that it was difficult to credibly argue that 
this consideration was one the Minister was not entitled to take into account. Even 
though I believed the decision was wrong in this respect, I struggled to find a convincing 
avenue to challenge its legality. Ultimately, I decided to abandon this dimension of the 
judgment and focus instead on other considerations that seemed to me to stretch the 
Minister’s powers under the Immigration framework to their limits.   
While I was in the final stages of rewriting this judgment, the controversies 
surrounding the rules of standing once again generated debate amongst constitutional 
lawyers following the UK Supreme Court’s judgment in Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2018] UKSC 27. In this judgment, the 
UKSC determined by a majority of 4-3 (with Lady Hale, Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson 
dissenting) that the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission did not have standing 
to challenge legislation banning abortions in Northern Ireland as being incompatible 
with the European Convention on Human Rights. For the majority, the Commission did 
not satisfy the ‘victim test’ that petitioners are expected to demonstrate when reviewing 
administrative action on Convention grounds. This did not deter the majority of UKSC 
justices from declaring the impugned Act disproportionate and therefore incompatible 
with the rights protected under the European Convention, although the appeal was 
eventually dismissed due to the lack of standing. 
I decided to follow a similar approach in my rewritten judgment. Rape Crisis 
Centre precedes the landmark judgment of AXA General Insurance Limited and others v 
The Lord Advocate and others [2011] UKSC 46 where the rules of standing in Scotland 
were significantly relaxed by the UK Supreme Court. Rather than pre-empting Axa and 
having the Outer House of the Court of Session change the rules of standing 11 years 
before the UKSC did, I decided that the petitioners would not have standing and their 
                                                          
2 A spokesperson for Rape Crisis Centre at the time commented “Given the gravity of the crime of rape, we 
were deeply saddened that the Home Secretary appears to have given economic considerations greater 
weight than the trauma experienced by women and girls who have suffered the crime of rape” in --. ‘Women's 
group seeks Tyson review’ (news.bbc.co.uk, 26 May 2000) available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/765641.stm . 
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case would be dismissed. I would, however, go on to assess the substance of the case 
and reach a conclusion as to its lawfulness. Therefore, I decided that the key difference 
between Lord Clarke’s judgment and my own would be that my feminist rewriting 
would more clearly highlight the feminist issues arising in the case, it would more 
thoroughly address the pitfalls of a stringent standing test that would exclude groups 
such as Rape Crisis Centre from seeking to set aside such decisions, and it would 
provide more rigorous scrutiny of the Minister’s exercise of discretion.   
My rewritten judgment reflects the law as it was at the time and chooses to rely 
heavily on obiter statements to highlight the issues and concerns raised for various 
pressure groups, especially those that provide assistance to classes of individuals that 
have traditionally faced societal or other barriers when bringing their cases to court. 
While much debate still exists on the appropriate approach to standing, hopefully such a 
judgment, had it been delivered in 2000, would have contributed to this discussion and 
become the impetus for change. The many obiter statements I have included could have 
had some persuasive value in subsequent judgments. 
When reading the rewritten judgment, one could object to the tone and style of its 
delivery. It would be fair for readers to question whether a judgment containing such 
extensive obiter statements chastising a Minister could have ever been delivered. It is 
also up for debate whether a judgment of this nature would realistically contribute to 
the clarity and precision of the law, something we have come to expect from judges in 
their opinions. I believe that such objections may be missing the point of the project. 
The impetus behind rewriting these judgments, in my view, is to push the boundaries of 
what may have been conceivable to include in a judgment at the time the case was 
decided and to offer an alternative, feminist perspective. This should then allow us to 
assess whether a more overt consideration of the feminist issues underpinning the case 
would have had an impact upon our understanding and development of the law. 
Hopefully, the rewritten judgment will provide such food for thought.  
While working on the Rape Crisis Centre judgment, I heavily relied on the 
invaluable expertise of Sandy Brindley, one of petitioners in this case, who continues to 
be at the forefront of the battle for supporting survivors of sexual assault, fighting 
domestic violence and trying to effect change through activism. In our meeting, she 
shared her frustration in relation to the continuing difficulties posed to pressure groups 
by particularly restrictive standing rules. For instance, in spite of the changes brought 
by the Axa judgment, for challenges on Convention rights grounds, petitioners must 
demonstrate ‘victim status’ for their case to proceed. This sets obvious obstacles for 
survivors of sexual assault and the pressure groups hoping to support their interests. 
For my analysis, I also found accounts on the law at the time by engaging with a 
variety of useful sources.3 The contributions of the editors and the fellow feminist 
                                                          
3 Tom Mullen and others, Judicial review in Scotland (Wiley, 1996), Scott Blair, Scots administrative law: cases 
and materials (W. Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), Aidan O'Neill, Judicial review in Scotland: a practitioner's 
guide (Butterworths, 1999). From more recent publications, I relied on Chris Himsworth & Christine O’Neill, 
Scotland’s Constitution Law and Practice (Bloomsbury Professional, 2015), Paul Reid, Public Law (W. Green, 
2015), Beatson and others, Administrative law: Text and Materials (Oxford University Press, 2011), Ronagh J.A. 
McQuigg ‘The victim test under the Human Rights Act 1998 and its implications for domestic violence cases’ 
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judges during the various workshops were equally indispensable in highlighting the 
feminist issues in the judgment and finding ways to interpret the law in that direction.  
As a final point, it may be interesting to examine what happened in the end with 
Mr Tyson’s match in Glasgow. In his analysis of the Rape Crisis Centre judgment, Lord 
Hope,4 recounted his experience from attending the eventual match. As he describes: 
‘Outside the Hampden Park Stadium there was large crowd of women who 
were engaged in a protest. They had lined the streets with banners reading 
“Straw equals Tyson equals Money before Justice”. Those who had dared to 
enter the stadium had had to run the gauntlet of their drum beats and cat-
calls. The women belonged to an organisation known as Glasgow Women 
against Rape’.5 
It is hoped that in similar situations where the legal process fails to provide a 
remedy, concerned citizens will continue to raise their voices and cause discomfort to 
those who try to ignore them. 
 
 
                                                          
[2011] European Human Rights Law Review 294-303, Rebecca Campbell, and Sheela Raja, ‘Secondary 
Victimization of Rape Victims: Insights from Mental Health Professionals Who Treat Survivors of Violence’ 
(1999) 14 Violence and Victims 261. 
4 Lord Hope, ‘Mike Tyson comes to Glasgow - a question of standing’ [2001] Public Law (Sum) 294-307. 
5 Ibid at 294. 
